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Abstract
We seem to hold corporations to an impossible standard. We call for profit maximization,
but at the same time want to place strict limits on the methods corporations may use to
obtain them. In this thesis, I explore two popular theories of the corporation: stakeholder
theory and shareholder theory. I examine the degree to which each theory explains the
corporation as it exists today, as defined in the law and through its behavior, but also the
theories‘ normative appeal. I conclude by positing what I find to be the best normative
account of the corporation: a theory of how we should structure the corporation in the
United States so it is the most morally-defensible.
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1.

Introduction
Adam Smith warned in 1776 that ―joint-stock companies…can…scarce ever fail

to do more harm than good.‖1 His warning went unheeded.
Joint-stock companies, more commonly known today as corporations, dominate
international business. While proprietorships and partnerships together outnumber
corporations almost five to one, corporations have earned more than twice the combined
profits of proprietorships and partnerships since 2000.2 In 2009, Walmart alone employed
more than two million people.3 That American GDP increased 43-fold since 1890 is in
large part due to the rise of the corporate structure.4
As powerful as corporations might be, however, they do not enjoy the simple
ownership structures of their smaller counterparts. Proprietorships occur when an
individual person opens (but does not incorporate) a business by himself or herself.
Partnerships occur when multiple people open (but do not incorporate) a business by
themselves and agree to share in the profits.5 But corporations?
The United States government defines a for-profit corporation as ―an independent
legal entity owned by shareholders.‖6 Corporations have potentially endless life spans
and usually shield their owners from liability. When I sue a corporation, I can hope to

1

Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. London: Penguin Books, 1999.
United States. United States Census Bureau. Washington D.C. Number of Tax Returns, Receipts, and Net
Income by Type of Business. January 01, 2012. Accessed April 15, 2013.
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0744.pdf.
3
"Global 500 2010: Biggest Companies: Employees." CNNMoney. January 01, 2010. Accessed April 28,
2013. http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/performers/companies/biggest.
4
Blanchard, Oliver. "U.S. GDP Since 1890." Lecture, Macroeconomics, 3E, Upper Saddle River, April 03,
2013. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpnpa/growth.pdf.
5
United States. Internal Revenue Service. Washington D.C. Small Business and Self-Employed Tax
Center. Accessed April 01, 2013.
http://brc.dc.gov/tax/irssummary.asp.
6
United States. U.S. Small Business Administration. Washington D.C. Choosing Your Business Structure.
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://www.sba.gov/content/corporation.
2
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recover what is owned by the corporation itself, but not the personal wealth or belongings
of individual shareholders or managers. The limited liability aspect is no coincidence; the
legal protections encourage new enterprise because neither entrepreneurs nor investors
would necessarily lose their life savings over one failed endeavor. Nicholas Butler
Murray, former President of Columbia University, told the New York Chamber of
Commerce in 1911 that ―the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery
of modern times [because] it makes possible huge economy in production and trading.‖7
Under federal and state law, the corporation thus becomes a sort of ―legal
person.‖8 The corporation may be taxed, the corporation may sue and be sued, the
corporation enjoys freedom of speech protection – and yet the corporation clearly is not a
person. Corporations still do not walk, talk, emote, or vote. Society cannot even punish
the corporate entity in the abstract, that is, in a way that does not simultaneously punish
its shareholders, employees, or other stakeholders. These complications of the corporate
structure invite inquiry regarding what a corporation is and also what a corporation
should be. To better articulate this account of a ‗legal person‘ is the project of corporate
theory.
Corporate theories can feature positive and normative components. Theories
might be positive, defining what the corporation is and explaining what corporations do.
Normative theories, meanwhile, assert why corporations should be structured a certain

7

Price, Sam. "Limited Liability: An Economic and Moral Consideration." The Student Journal of Law.
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://www.sjol.co.uk/issue-4/limited-liability-an-economic-and-moralconsideration.
8
Smith, G., and D. Dyer. "The Rise and Transformation of the American Corporation." In The American
Corporation Today, by Carl Kaysen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
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way and how corporations should behave.9 My goal in this paper is to analyze two
popular theories of the corporation through these lenses of positivity and normativity, in
the process developing what I believe to be the most compelling account of the modernday corporation in the United States.

9

Donaldson, Thomas. "The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and
Implications." The Academy of Management Review 20, no. 1 (1995): 65-91. Accessed April 01, 2013.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/258887.
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2.

The Fiduciary Theories
A fiduciary duty is a responsibility to act as an agent of another party‘s interest.10

Corporate theory derived from notions of fiduciary duty holds that managers must act on
behalf of some other group, as a result of either legal or moral obligations. Two branches
of fiduciary theory enjoy widespread support: shareholder theory and stakeholder theory.
Shareholder theorists argue that managers must act in accordance with the interests of a
corporation‘s shareholders, but stakeholder theorists believe managers must act in
accordance with the interests of everyone legitimately and substantially affected by the
operations of the firm (including employees, customers, and the local community, in
addition to the shareholders).11 Commonly known as ―Friedman vs. Freeman‖ due to the
proponents of each theory, the shareholder-stakeholder debate boils down to the degree to
which managers should consider non-shareholder interests.12 Below I explain the
arguments in support of each theory.
2.1

Shareholder Theory
Shareholder theorists want to limit the range of stakeholders that factor into

corporate decision-making. They argue that the American legal system, which protects
free enterprise and private property, turns business managers into ―the employees of the
owners of the business.‖13 Since investors are the owners of corporations, managers
become the agents of these shareholders. As agents, managers are responsible for
10

"Fiduciary Duty." Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School. Accessed April 01, 2013.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty.
11
Smith, Jeff H. "MIT Sloan Management Review." MIT Sloan Management Review RSS. July 15, 2013.
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate/.
12
Ronnegrad, David, and Craig N. Smith. "Shareholder vs. Stakeholders: How Liberal and Libertarian
Political Philosophy Frames the Basic Debate on Business Ethics." INSEAD Faculty & Research Working
Papers, 2011. Accessed April 1, 2013. http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=48947.
13
Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." The New York
Times Magazine (New York), September 13, 1970.
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furthering shareholder interests, which Milton Friedman assumes generally to be profit
maximization.14
Friedman, though, adds an important caveat to his description of acceptable
corporate behavior. If managers represent shareholder interests, and shareholders seek
only profit maximization, shareholder theory would seem to compel managers to
singularly pursue profit. To most, this loses normative appeal. We do not want
corporations polluting rivers and starving employees in order to boost investment returns.
As a result, shareholder theorists specify that managers are constrained by ―the basic
rules of society…embodied in law and…ethical custom.‖15 They preempt objections that
shareholder theory encourages law-breaking or immoral behavior by explicitly stating in
the theory that managers cannot break the law or engage in customarily-immoral
behavior. For Friedman and the shareholder theorists, this qualified shareholder account
provides the most persuasive theory of the corporation.16
2.1.1

As Positive Theory

Central to shareholder theory is the principal-agent relationship between the
shareholders and the management. Managers assume a fiduciary duty to further the
shareholder interest of earning returns on their investment, while simultaneously
respecting law and ethical custom. Friedman‘s caveat thus allows corporations to care for
the interests of stakeholders – as long as the care can be explained by deference to law,
ethical custom, or long run profit maximization. Consequently, the manager that respects
stakeholder interest can still be said to practice shareholder management. Even Friedman
14

Ibid
Ibid
16
Smith, Jeff H. "MIT Sloan Management Review." MIT Sloan Management Review RSS. July 15, 2013.
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate/.
15
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admits this makes it difficult to judge ―how well he [the shareholder manager] is
performing his task.‖17
The assessment of a corporation‘s adherence to shareholder theory must therefore
explore the degree of respect afforded to stakeholder interests. Given the spirit of
Friedman‘s account, I argue that shareholder theory, properly understood, expects from
managers very minimal commitments to stakeholders. I must make this assumption about
the ethics in Friedman‘s account because he does not explain how his understanding of
‗ethical custom‘ translates to stakeholder obligations (a problem I address later).
However, the tone and context of Friedman‘s argument seem most consistent with the
view that ethics provide a check against particularly egregious corporate actions rather
than a strict standard that every corporate action must meet. For instance, Friedman
makes a point to say that firms should not ―take seriously‖ their responsibilities to
stakeholders like employees and the environment.18 In practice, I believe this means
corporations can be said to accord with stakeholder theory when they prioritize short run
profits over stakeholder interests, as long as they do not knowingly sacrifice long run
profits, break laws, or violate very obvious ethical norms in the process.
2.1.1.1

The Actions Corporations Take

Lynn Stout of Cornell University sees a heavy influence of shareholder theory on
corporate actions today. She notes how, in the name of profits, ―public companies have
sold key assets (Kodak's patents), outsourced jobs (Apple), cut back on customer service
(Sears) and research and development (Motorola)…and lobbied Congress for corporate

17

Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." The New York
Times Magazine (New York), September 13, 1970.
18
Ibid
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tax loopholes (GE).‖19 For each miscarriage of shareholder management by an Enron or
Worldcom, there are multiple cases of legal, sincere attempts by corporations to generate
returns for shareholders despite the costs to other stakeholders.
For example, firms frequently move jobs overseas to improve margins. U.S.based multinational companies reduced their American labor force by 2.9 million in the
past decade while increasing overseas employment by 2.4 million.20 As early as 2004, 80
percent of American firms had discussed outsourcing labor.21 When profits conflicted
with the interests of existing employees, profits won out.
The same logic applied to the environment. According to the UN Principles for
Responsible Investment Initiative, the world‘s 3,000 biggest corporations cause
approximately $2.2 trillion in annual damage to the environment. Between six and seven
percent of these companies‘ profits would have been lost if they adopted more
environmentally-friendly business practices.22 Yet the profits were not lost. The
corporations chose to protect their margins and chose to pollute – a clear prioritization of
shareholder interests over the public interest in environmental health.
2.1.1.2

Shareholder Theory as Managerial Justification

Whether managers actually try to prioritize shareholder interests remains unclear.
Most academics feel they do. Academics label shareholder theory ―the driving force of
19

Stout, Lynn. "'Maximizing Shareholder Value' Is Ill-conceived Concept." Los Angeles Times. September
02, 2012. Accessed April 01, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/02/opinion/la-oe-stout-stockprices-20120902.
20
Lach, Alex. "5 Facts About Overseas Outsourcing." Center for American Progress. July 9, 2012.
Accessed April 28, 2013. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/news/2012/07/09/11898/5-factsabout-overseas-outsourcing/.
21
Gongloff, Mark. "U.S. Jobs Jumping Ship." CNNMoney. March 13, 2003. Accessed April 1, 2013.
http://money.cnn.com/2003/03/13/news/economy/jobs_offshore/.
22
Jowit, Juliette. "World's Top Firms Cause $2.2tn of Environmental Damage, Report Estimates." The
Guardian. February 18, 2010. Accessed April 01, 2013.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/18/worlds-top-firms-environmental-damage.
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21st century business‖ and view it as ―entrenched‖ in the Western philosophy of corporate
governance.23,24 A 2007 article in the Journal of Business Ethics found these academics
might be right: 31 of 34 corporate directors surveyed for the article claimed to have a
legal duty to maximize shareholder wealth. The directors admitted they would pollute the
environment, fire employees, and threaten the public interest if it would improve
profitability (as long as it was legal). 25
In contrast, most managers claim not to practice shareholder management. Jack
Welch, the iconic CEO of General Electric, claimed to speak on behalf of most corporate
executives when he told the Financial Times that shareholder concerns never factor into
his decision-making. ―On the face of it,‖ he argued, ―shareholder value is the dumbest
idea in the world…shareholder value is a result not a strategy…your main constituencies
[the interests to which managers attend] are your employees, your customers, and your
products.‖26 While understanding it is likely a firm will benefit from treating stakeholders
well, managers view stakeholders not as instruments for profit but as constituencies
inherently deserving of considerate treatment. In fact, only 35 percent of corporations
even mention maximization of shareholder value in their mission statements. Less than
half mention shareholder value at all.27

23

Jensen, Keld. "To Hell With Shareholder Value." Forbes. March 18, 2013. Accessed April 01, 2013.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/keldjensen/2013/03/18/to-hell-with-shareholder-value/.
24
Lazonick, William, and Mary O'Sullivan. "Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for
Corporate Governance." Economy and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 13-35. doi:10.1080/030851400360541.
25
Heracleous, Loizos, and Luh Luh Lan. "The Myth of Shareholder Capitalism." Harvard Business
Review. April 2010. Accessed April 01, 2013. http://hbr.org/2010/04/the-myth-of-shareholdercapitalism/ar/.
26
"Welch Condemns Share Price Focus." Financial Times. Accessed April 01, 2013.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/294ff1f2-0f27-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac.html.
27
Loderer, Claudio, Lukas Roth, Urs Waelchli, and Petra Joerg. "Shareholder Value: Principles,
Declarations, and Actions." Financial Management 39, no. 1 (2010): 5-32. doi:10.1111/j.1755053X.2009.01064.x.
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2.1.1.3

Shareholder Theory and the Law

The positive shareholder account must also address whether the law requires
corporations to practice shareholder management. An understanding of ‗what the
corporation is‘ draws heavily from the way we define corporations in our legal code.
According to the American Bar Association, corporate managers have legal
fiduciary duties to the corporation and to shareholders.28 American courts have generally
held that the duty to the corporation as a whole does not entail a duty to nonshareholders.29 While it remains possible that Friedman overlooks that shareholder
preferences might require substantial commitments to stakeholders, he is right to argue
that the law requires managers to act only as agents of the shareholders – not of other
stakeholders.
2.1.2

As Normative Theory

Normative shareholder theory draws from three primary arguments. The first
appeals to private property rights, applying them to corporations and their owners. The
second makes a consequentialist argument that shareholder management yields the best
outcomes for society. The third argument claims that only shareholder management
avoids illegal and indefensible taxation of shareholders.
2.1.2.1

Shareholder Theory and Property Rights

A free market requires that individuals have the rights to use their property
however they please and to reap the rewards of their property‘s use. Alternatively put, a
well-functioning market only exists when the law protects individuals‘ ability to be both
28

"Fiduciary Duties and Potential Liabilities of Directors and Officers of Financially Distressed
Corporations." American Bar. Accessed April 01, 2013.
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0003/materials/tip3.pdf.
29
Ibid
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controllers and owners of their property. When these conditions are satisfied, the motive
of profit drives people toward economically efficient outcomes.30 Adam Smith promised
as much in A Wealth of Nations. Self-interested individuals, when they decide how to use
their property and enjoy the benefits of its usage, will receive guidance from an invisible
hand toward economic efficiency.
In the modern corporation, however, different groups own and control the same
property. Shareholders own the firm‘s wealth and assets, but managers put them to use.
Shareholder interest and managerial self-interest might not align, so the invisible hand
cannot produce efficient outcomes. Friedman thus sees normative appeal in uniting the
property owners and controllers as best as possible. Legally requiring the manager to use
the property as the shareholder would – generally to maximize profit – equates the selfinterest of the controller with that of the owner. They become one again, as they were in
Adam Smith‘s vision of the free market, and the invisible hand returns. Without agency
costs, perfectly implemented shareholder theory will thus produce economically efficient
outcomes. To Friedman, the normative appeal of economic efficiency is self-evident.
2.1.2.2

The Consequentialist Argument

Additionally, shareholder theorists argue that shareholder management stimulates
economic growth. The corporate structure allows individuals and institutions to pool
resources under singular control. With newfound capital, business ventures gain the
ability to grow in size, but more importantly, in scale. For instance, the rise of the

30

Berle, Adolf A., and Gardiner C. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York:
Macmillan, 1933.

10

corporate structure in the 19th century coincided with a period of decreasing production
costs and increasing profitability in the United States.31
When managers maximize this profitability, they can return excess profits to
shareholders as dividends or reinvest them to appreciate their stock price. In either case,
the shareholder enjoys a high return. A virtuous cycle begins. Cheaper goods make
consumption more affordable for individuals, who find themselves holding more
investable funds and wanting access to the corporations‘ massive profits through
investment.32 Corporations receive capital influxes, scale up even further, and produce
goods even more cheaply. As Robert Reich put it, large corporations shift power ―to
consumers and investors…[who enjoy] better and cheaper products, and higher
returns.‖33
The shareholder theorists assert that only shareholder management will offer
sufficient incentive for investors to capitalize corporations. If firms spend capital for
purely social purposes, as many firms do today with corporate social responsibility (CSR)
projects, investors‘ expected returns drop. They respond by investing less, firms
accumulate less capital, production becomes more expensive, and so do goods. When
firms do not maximize profit, society sees two fundamental tenets of economic growth
contract: consumption (as a result of higher prices) and investment (as a result of lower
expected returns).

31

Ibid
Ibid
33
Reich, Robert B. Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life. New
York: Vintage Books, 2007.
32
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2.1.2.3

Only Shareholder Managers Can Avoid Illegal Taxation

When a manager spends corporate profits in a way that reduces returns to
shareholders, he is spending shareholder money. Friedman finds this analogous to the
manager ―imposing taxes, on the one hand, and deciding how the tax proceeds are spent,
on the other.‖34 Such a privately-instituted tax is, to Friedman, indefensible. We establish
electoral and judicial institutions for the very purpose of regulating the practice of
taxation; managerial taxation of investors lacks the protections of these institutions. For
instance, our government‘s checks and balances separate the functions of levying taxes
and deciding how to spend them, while stakeholder management combines them. The
stakeholder manager taxes his investors and decides for which cause the tax dollars will
be spent. As Friedman concludes, ―if they are to impose taxes and make expenditures to
foster ‗social objectives,‘ then political machinery must be set up to make the assessment
of taxes and to determine through a political process the objectives to be served.‖35 Since
corporations do not have this political machinery, stakeholder theory should be avoided.
Only by maximizing shareholder value for investors will the corporation avoid spending
shareholder money and avoid the unjust taxation pitfall. Friedman believes this gives
shareholder theory enormous normative appeal.
2.2

Stakeholder Theory
The stakeholders of a firm are individuals or groups that have an interest in the

success or failure of that firm. In this paper, I use Edward Freeman‘s narrow group of
stakeholders, which includes the firm‘s shareholders, suppliers, employees, customers,

34

Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." The New York
Times Magazine (New York), September 13, 1970.
35
Ibid

12

management, and its local community, because he finds the narrow account more
persuasive.36
Each stakeholder might have a different stake in the company, but all have the
ability to impact other stakeholders through their stakes. For instance, take the
shareholders, employees, and customers of Toyota Corporation. Shareholders have a
financial stake, expecting a positive return on their investment in Toyota stock or bonds;
employees have a compensatory stake, expecting a livelihood and meaningful
employment in exchange for their time, work, and loyalty. Customers have yet another
stake, expecting a well-functioning automobile in exchange for their business.
Regardless, a failure by any stakeholder to fulfill its role in Toyota‘s operations
significantly harms the firm. Without investment from shareholders, the firm lacks the
capital to buy production sites or build machinery. Without employees, the firm lacks the
ability to put its land or machinery to use. Without customers, the firm lacks the cash
flow to satisfy investors and pay employees.
Given the ability for each class of stakeholders to destroy a firm, stakeholder
theorists believe the role of the firm manager is to balance the interests of each of these
classes – equally. Stakeholder theorists do not ―give primacy to one stakeholder group
over another…because when relationships [among stakeholders] become unbalanced, the
survival of the whole firm is in jeopardy.‖37

36

Evan, William, and R. Edward Freeman. ―A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian
Capitalism.‖ In An Introduction to Business Ethics. Chryssides, George D., and John H. Kaler. (Cengage
Learning EMEA, 1993), 254-266.
37
Evan, William, and R. Edward Freeman. ―A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian
Capitalism.‖ In An Introduction to Business Ethics. Chryssides, George D., and John H. Kaler. (Cengage
Learning EMEA, 1993), 254-266.
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2.2.1

As Positive Theory

For stakeholder theory to enjoy positive persuasiveness, managers today must
demonstrate a concern for stakeholder interests that exceeds the obligations of law and
ethical custom. This would manifest itself in corporations not only sacrificing profits in
the name of other stakeholder interests, but doing so out of genuine consideration for the
welfare of their stakeholders.38 The stakeholder manager cannot prioritize shareholder
returns, so he cannot care for stakeholder relationships in the name of long run profit
maximization or a sort of reluctant adherence to laws or social norms. Instead, as
Friedman himself observed, the stakeholder corporation‘s actions must stem from a
serious sense of responsibility for stakeholder well being.39
2.2.1.1

The Actions Corporations Take

The 21st century has seen a rise in CSR projects. By definition, CSR defies profits
in the name of other interests. Whether a CEO increases costs to preserve the
environment or decreases prices to benefit the consumer, his or her action primarily aims
to benefit non-shareholder groups. When a CEO contracts with a more expensive,
environmentally-friendly supplier, he or she is said to be practicing CSR; when a CEO
offers employees free day care programs, he or she also is said to be practicing CSR. The
overlap between CSR and stakeholder theory is obvious, but the Harvard Kennedy
School makes a point to mention how CSR exists because companies feel ―accountable
not only to shareholders but also to stakeholders such as employees, consumers,

38

Smith, Jeff H. "MIT Sloan Management Review." MIT Sloan Management Review RSS. July 15, 2013.
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate/.
39
Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." The New York
Times Magazine (New York), September 13, 1970.
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suppliers, local communities, policymakers, and society-at-large.‖40 Consequently,
stakeholder theory would hold positive appeal if it were the case that corporations widely
adopt CSR and do so because of genuine (non-economic) concern for the welfare of all
stakeholders.
KPMG found that 95 percent of the world‘s 250 largest companies claim to
practice CSR. Interestingly, the same study found that a company is more likely to
implement CSR if it is incorporated.41 The report concluded that from its philosophical
beginnings with Freeman to its large-scale support today, stakeholder-oriented projects
have grown from ―an optional but nice activity… to [having] become virtually
mandatory.‖42 Clearly, corporations appear willing to sacrifice short-term profits in order
to protect other stakeholder interests through their CSR. If the corporations‘ justification
for the CSR invokes stakeholder philosophy, then stakeholder theory might prove to be
quite persuasive as a positive theory of the corporation.
2.2.1.2

Stakeholder Theory as Managerial Justification

Managers do seem to cite stakeholder philosophy as the justification for their CSR
and other stakeholder-oriented projects. Their concern for stakeholder welfare appears
less rooted in a sense of obligation to law and ethical custom – and especially not a
strategy for long run profit maximization – than in a deep philosophical commitment to
the welfare of their stakeholders. While Friedman‘s shareholder theory does not preclude
consideration of stakeholder interests, the data implies that managers feel a much more

40

"Defining Corporate Social Responsibility." Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative. Accessed April
01, 2013. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/init_define.html.
41
"KPMG International Corporate Responsibility Reporting Survey 2011 ." KPMG. Accessed April 01,
2013. http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporateresponsibility/Pages/2011-survey.aspx.
42
Ibid
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robust obligation to stakeholders than a reasonably interpreted shareholder theory can
justify.
Thomas Donaldson of the Academy of Management find empirical evidence that
corporate executives conceive of stakeholder relationships in a way that accords with
stakeholder theory. Studies by Baumhart (1968), Brenner & Molander (1977), and Posner
& Schmidt (1984) found that a majority of corporate managers believe it unethical – not
just uneconomical – to prioritize the interests of shareholders. Baumhart‘s study in
particular highlighted the popularity of stakeholder management: he estimated that 80
percent of managers favored the stakeholder approach. Clarkson (1991), Halal (1990),
and Bartkus & Glassman (2007) all confirmed ―significant‖ ethical concern for
stakeholder interests among United States corporations.43
Additionally, close to 60 percent of firms cite ―ethical considerations‖ as their
reason for adopting CSR – compared with only 32 percent that mention ―shareholder
value.‖44 Jorg, Loderer, and Roth (2004) conducted a similar study and found similar
results. They interviewed managers from 313 Swiss firms, finding that 81 percent of
firms wanted to maximize stakeholder value and more than half wanted to maximize
shareholder value only ―as long as it did not come at the expense of other stakeholders in
the firm.‖45
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2.2.1.3

Stakeholder Theory and the Law

Currently, the law does not impose on managers a fiduciary duty to nonshareholders. The law discusses stakeholder rights in terms of permission rather than
obligation. More than half of American states have passed statutes that have become
known as ‗permissible concern‘ laws. These explicitly permit a corporation‘s board of
directors to consider, in outlining corporate strategies and goals, the interests of ―a host of
non-shareowner constituencies, including employees, creditors, suppliers, and local
communities.‖46 Connecticut even requires this consideration.47 This means that
corporate directors, though rarely required to care for stakeholder interests, would not get
punished for doing so. Under the doctrine of permissible concern, stakeholder
management is thus allowed – but not required – under the law.
Perhaps because corporations legally do not have to consider stakeholder
interests, the law limits the degree to which corporations can ignore stakeholders in
decision-making. Managers have legal duties to honor contractual obligations and
relevant statutes (like anti-pollution laws); they cannot always use the lack of a fiduciary
duty as a legal justification for stakeholder exploitation.48 For example, congressional
legislation such as the Clean Air Act and the National Labor Relations Act force
managers to respect the interests of local populations and employees up to legally-defined
levels.49
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2.2.2

As Normative Theory

Given the relatively weak presence of stakeholder philosophy in American law,
stakeholder theorists justify their account mostly in the realm of morality. They believe
only stakeholder management is morally-defensible and that the corporation should be
structured in accordance with stakeholder philosophy. At the core of their normative
account lie three appeals: to Kantian ethics (stakeholders must not be treated as a mere
means), to individual responsibility (corporations are responsible for their effects on
others), and to consequentialism (corporations adhering to stakeholder philosophy
produce the best outcomes in society).50
2.2.2.1

Kant and the ‘Mere Means’ Defense

Freeman invokes Kant in claiming that stakeholders must not be treated as a mere
means. He argues that each stakeholder in a corporation becomes a stakeholder through
voluntary exchanges from which the stakeholder hopes to become better off. When one
stakeholder harms another stakeholder in the name of self-interest – without including the
latter in the decision-making process – the first uses the second as a mere means, which is
morally-indefensible. For example, managers treat employees as a mere means to profit
when they arbitrarily decide to lower employee wages. The decision, which affects
employee welfare, did not include the employees‘ participation, and Freeman (and he
claims Kant) would find this unjust.
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2.2.2.2

Corporations Must Be Responsible for Their Actions

The responsibility justification centers on the idea that corporations should take
responsibility for their actions. Modern corporations have grown so large and influential
in society that they now have an ethical duty to care for those under their control and
influence. By definition, the stakeholders are those subjected to corporate control and
influence, so the responsibility argument reaches the conclusion that corporations have a
duty to care for stakeholder welfare. As Adolf Berle described it, there is ―an insistence
that power in economic organization shall be subjected to the same tests of public benefit
which have been applied…to…power otherwise located [i.e. government].‖ The test, for
Berle and other stakeholder theorists, is ―the well-being of those who are subject to the
organization, whether workers, investors, or consumers.‖51 Alternatively put, in order to
hold corporations responsible for their actions – a notion Berle would argue has intrinsic
normative appeal – society must require stakeholder management.
2.2.2.3

Stakeholder Theory Produces Better Outcomes for Society

The consequentialist argues simply that society is best off when corporations
practice stakeholder management. Typically, stakeholder theory is defended by ―the
utilitarian stream of consequentialism.‖52 Either the best corporate action is the one that
maximizes the total utility of all stakeholders, or the one that maximizes the number of
stakeholders that receive utility from the action. The consequentialists believe the
stakeholder manager will deliver the best outcome in both cases, so they submit
stakeholder

theory

offers

the

best

normative

account

of

the

corporation.
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3.

An Analysis of The Fiduciary Theories
I will begin the chapter by presenting the objections to shareholder theory, then

move to objections to stakeholder theory. I will conclude by considering arguments that
critique fiduciary theories in general.
3.1

Objections to Shareholder Theory

3.1.1

Friedman Misunderstands Ethical Custom

Shareholder theory does not call for unconstrained profit maximization. The
Friedman caveat prioritizes law and ethical custom, articulating that managers should
maximize profits only after they honor their legal and ethical commitments.
When I presented the shareholder account, I admitted to making an assumption
about the scope of ethical custom. I argued that Friedman‘s theory, properly understood,
tied managers only to minimal ethical commitments, but Ken Goodpaster sees a
difference between Friedman‘s account, properly understood, and our society‘s actual
ethical custom, properly understood. In other words, Goodpaster disagrees with Friedman
that our ethical custom imposes only minimal obligations on the corporate manager. And
when Friedman is forced to account for the full scope of our ethical custom, Goodpaster
says, shareholder theory fails to distinguish itself from stakeholder theory in any
meaningful way.
Goodpaster asserts that our ethical custom involves obligations to everyone
affected by our actions. Whenever we pursue self-interested goals, we must still respect
fundamental moral obligations to society during our pursuit – that our project is selfinterested does not relieve us of publicly interested duties. Our ethical custom in a sense
demands personal stakeholder management, since we must consider during our decision20

making process how our actions will impact the interests of others. Goodpaster then
posits a Nemo Dat Principle (NDP) that ―no one can expect of an agent behavior that is
ethically less responsible than what he would expect of himself.‖53 The NDP, applied to
corporations, holds corporate managers to the same ethical standard of their shareholders.
Taken together, ethical custom and the NDP require corporations to honor moral
obligations to stakeholders. Individuals must consider stakeholder interests when
deciding upon individual actions, corporations must abide by the same ethical standard as
individuals, and so corporations must consider stakeholders when deciding upon
corporate actions. Even though non-fiduciary in nature, these stakeholder obligations
remain, in Goodpaster‘s eyes, ―equally important.‖54 Goodpaster thus concludes that our
ethical custom – to which Friedman tethers corporate managers – forces shareholder
theory to converge with stakeholder theory. Corporations have equally important moral
obligations to consider the interests of non-shareholders in their decision-making process,
because our ethical custom requires them to do so.
3.1.2

Does the Legal Fiduciary Duty to Shareholders Obligate Shareholder
Management?

Even stakeholder theorists recognize that managers have a fiduciary duty to
shareholders that they do not have to other stakeholders. They understand this is simply
―a legal reality.‖55 But shareholder theorists and stakeholder theorists clash over the
significance of the fiduciary duty.
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Stakeholder theorists argue that the spirit of the fiduciary duty is to protect
shareholders from managerial greed: it is not to assert a primacy for shareholders in the
hierarchy of corporate decision-making. In the absence of managerial self-dealing or
corruption as issues, they claim, the law does not ask managers to prioritize shareholder
interests.56
The law itself defines the fiduciary duty to shareholders as involving duties of
care and loyalty. The duty of care is an obligation to govern prudently: a promise to
manage the corporation with a good faith attempt to pursue the best interests of the
corporation as a whole. The duty of loyalty prohibits managers from engaging in
improper self-enrichment and self-dealing. The legal text, in both cases, makes no
mention of the relationship between shareholders interests and those of other
stakeholders. On the other hand, both duties refer to a manager‘s obligation to earnestly
pursue corporate interests, which suggests the stakeholder theorists are correct about the
spirit of the fiduciary duty.
The fundamental question is thus whether a public interest, such as the welfare of
non-shareholders, can be plausibly understood as an interest of the corporation. Managers
have a legal duty to further the interest of the corporation, and if the corporation has an
interest in caring for the interests of its stakeholders, (that is separate from the interest in
long run profit accumulation) then the law would seem to require stakeholder
management. However, whether the corporation has a legitimate interest in safeguarding
the welfare of its stakeholders is a normative question, answerable only by moral
philosophy. The significance of this objection is that current law does not preclude
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stakeholder management if one can persuasively defend stakeholder management as a
legitimate interest of the corporation.
3.1.3

Do Shareholders Have Interests Other than Profit Maximization?

Friedman says that managers are the agents of shareholders, responsible for
furthering shareholder interests. Then he quickly concludes that shareholder interests, in
most cases, are simply to maximize returns under the constraints of law and ethical
custom. In emphasizing the centrality of profit in investor decision-making, Friedman
takes what Elizabeth Anderson calls a homo economicus view of human beings; we are
rational, self-interested pursuers of utility maximization. But as Anderson points out,
homo economicus approaches ―ignore the actual causes of human behavior.‖57
Investment data suggests that investors frequently prioritize social concerns over
returns. The term socially-responsible investing (SRI) was coined to refer to investors‘
desire to ―promote concepts and ideals that they feel strongly about [through their
investments].‖58 SRI has grown more than 22 percent since 2010 and now roughly one
out of every nine invested dollars in the United States can be classified as SRI.59
Investors, from retail to institutional, commit to SRI even though it has ―has been
generally disappointing in the returns department.‖60
It would thus appear that Friedman overly discounts investors‘ attention to
business ethics. Many investors hold businesses to a much higher standard than mere
57
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conformity to the basic rules of society. Friedman might be correct that the law requires
corporations to further only shareholder interests, but the advancement of shareholder
interests in turn demands far greater consideration for stakeholder interests than
Friedman‘s account, if it is to be meaningfully different from the stakeholder account,
can justify.
3.2

Objections to Stakeholder Theory

3.2.1

Who Counts as a Stakeholder?

Freeman himself recognizes there are two definitions of ―stakeholder.‖ The
narrow definition refers to groups ―vital‖ to the success and survival of the corporation;
the wide definition includes any group or individual who can affect or be affected by the
corporation.61 Freeman proclaims his easiest step is to defend the narrow account, but I
find even that problematic. Groups beyond Freeman‘s employees, suppliers, etc. satisfy
his narrow definition of a stakeholder. The actions of competitors, for instance, prove
―vital‖ to the success of a corporation indeed. If a competitor decides to sell its product
for $10 instead of $10,000, it will profoundly alter the success of a corporation. And yet
Freeman precludes competitors from stakeholdership. He argues that companies can exist
in monopoly settings – without competitors – where the tenets of stakeholder theory still
apply. According to Freeman, monopolies still do and should consider the interests of
other stakeholders in their decision-making. In other words, he seems to say that
competitors do not count as stakeholders because they do not always exist.62
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This is incredibly odd reasoning. Corporations can also exist without other
stakeholders that Freeman does include in his account. A corporation does not need
suppliers; it can produce self-sufficiently. A corporation does not need a local
community; it can operate in unpopulated and remote areas. Freeman would probably
have to concede this point and admit that one must only care for suppliers and local
communities when they exist. This, however, would defeat Freeman‘s original
justification for precluding competitors. If local communities do not always exist, but
must factor into the stakeholder manager‘s decision-making when they do, it follows that
the stakeholder manager can function in a monopoly setting but still must consider the
interests of competitors when competitors exist.
The moment Freeman includes competitors and other ―wide-definition‖
stakeholders into his narrow account, his theory begins to lose both positive and
normative persuasiveness. Are corporations today actually factoring in the interests of
competitors when making decisions? Probably not, and there is a strong possibility that
corporations actually attempt to harm competitors. Should corporations be considering
the interests of competitors in their decision-making? Almost definitely not. Especially
when we consider other elements of Freeman‘s stakeholder theory – like how the
corporate manager must weigh stakeholder interests equally – it seems even more wrong
to require corporations to give the same considerations to the interests of their investors
and of their competitors.
3.2.2

Do We Always Treat Others as Mere Means in Business Relationships?

Freeman heavily relies on Kantian ethics to justify managerial obligations to other
stakeholders. He finds that ―stakeholders have some inalienable rights to participate in
25

decisions that substantially affect their welfare or involve their being used as a means to
another‘s ends.‖63 Managers who ignore the interests of legitimate stakeholders use these
stakeholders as mere means to corporate profits, meaning managers have an ethical
obligation to practice stakeholder theory.
However, Freeman appears to ignore Kant‘s distinction between means and mere
means. To treat someone as a means to your benefit is allowable and morally-defensible;
Kant would allow me to work my employee to the bone in the name of corporate profit as
long the employee legitimately consents to the treatment. To treat someone as a mere
means is not morally-defensible, and consent is not enough to disqualify a relationship
from being a mere means relationship. When we force others into action, either by lying
or coercion, they do not truly consent, and the consent of a mentally ill person similarly
cannot be understood as legitimate consent.64 For instance, I cannot get an employee to
sign a contract by promising two years of employment and then fire him the next week to
cut costs. I solicited his consent by lying, which would undermine the legitimacy of the
consent. But Freeman‘s point is even larger. He seems to say that every means
relationship, even those with legitimate consent from both parties, is a mere means
relationship. I can never fire any employee without including that employee in the
decision-making process, or else I treat the employee as a mere means. I disagree.
Elizabeth Anderson points out how business relationships, by definition, are use
relationships. I contract with a supplier not to give the supplier a livelihood, but because I
need supplies to produce my goods and ultimately to earn profit. I use my supplier as a
63
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means to profit, my employees as a means to profit, and all other stakeholders as a means
to profit. And they use my corporation as a means too. My employees view my
corporation as a means to a livelihood, my suppliers view my corporation as a means to
revenue, and my customers view my corporation as a means to goods and services. As
long as stakeholder relationships stem from legitimate consent, and Freeman‘s
description of ‗voluntary, mutually-beneficial exchanges‘ suggests they do, then it would
appear that use relationships do not violate Kantian ethics and so his justification for
stakeholder management fails. There is an important difference between means and mere
means that Freeman overlooks.
3.2.3

What Use is Stakeholder Theory in Practice?

Goodpaster claims that stakeholder theory cannot guide corporate decisionmaking. It might outline who will be affected by a decision and to what extent, but it does
not provide a platform from which a manager can reach a decision. In Goodpaster‘s
words, ―to be told that stakeholders are or must be ‗taken into account‘ is…to be told
very little.‖65
Freeman tries to alleviate Goodpaster‘s concern with two principles of
stakeholder management. First, corporations must be managed for the benefit of their
stakeholders, who in turn deserve a role in a firm‘s decision-making when decisions
affect their stakes. Second, managers must enter into a fiduciary relationship with the
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corporation as an abstract entity, which also means a fiduciary duty to the long-term
interests of each class of stakeholders.66
Goodpaster would likely remain unsatisfied. He would ask what it means to have
a role in a firm‘s decision-making process, hoping that Freeman would recognize the
infeasibility of requiring firms to call a stakeholder‘s representative each time a decision
affected that stakeholder. Goodpaster would want a practical account of how managers
can satisfy their ethical responsibility to include stakeholders in decision-making.
Similarly, Goodpaster would ask Freeman to crystallize his second principle so a
manager would know how to honor his fiduciary duty to the corporation as an abstract
entity. Would the manager need to maximize total utility, after the utilities of all
stakeholders are considered? Or would the best decision maximize the number of
stakeholders receiving utility? Freeman does not answer these questions, even in a later
paper of his that claimed to outline four levels of ―stakeholder responsibility in practice.‖
Goodpaster would find this alarming considered managers are expected to apply
stakeholder theory and practice stakeholder management.67
3.3

Objections to Both Fiduciary Theories
Fiduciary theories of the corporation hinge on agency. The corporate manager

must make decisions on behalf of another group and attempt to further the interests of his
principals when making decisions. If managers defy their agential responsibilities – if
they neglect the interests of their principals – fiduciary theories of the corporation lose
substantial appeal, both as positive and normative accounts. In other words, if we cannot
66
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trust managers to respect their agential responsibilities, or hold them accountable when
they self-deal, it is not clear why we should structure corporations around a concept of
agency.
3.3.1

Do Managers Neglect the Interests of their Principals?

Critics of fiduciary corporate theories do not expect managers to prioritize the
interests of principals over self-interest. Adam Smith recognized two hundred years ago
that ―the directors of such [corporations]…being the managers rather of other people‘s
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with
the same anxious vigilance…Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail,
more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.‖ 68 Managers do not
own the property they control and Smith predicted that both the stakeholder and
shareholder managers would attend first to their own self-interest. Overwhelming
evidence of managerial greed supports his view.
Managers frequently further their private interests at the expense of shareholder
and stakeholder welfare. For instance, the compensation of chief executive officers
(CEOs) is 20 to 40 percent higher when the CEO has a voice in determining his or her
own compensation.69 The result is managerial compensation that almost never reflects
levels that accord with shareholder or stakeholder interests. When investors have
expanded power to change executive compensation (such as when members of the
executive compensation committee own equity in the corporation), they almost always
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respond by lowering executive pay.70 Even the corporate executives‘ use of private jets
plummets when control of the firm moves from public shareholders to private equity
companies, who have more incentive to ensure corporate compensation aligns with the
best interest of shareholders.71
The managerial greed is not limited to compensation: managers frequently
prioritize their personal control of the firm as well. The best examples come from
takeover attempts. Managers typically resist takeovers even if acquirers offer
shareholders a premium for their ownership stakes.72 On the other hand, when managers
possess ‗golden parachute‘ provisions in their contracts – large and guaranteed payouts in
the event of takeovers – their resistance drops noticeably.73 A study by Duke University
even showed that managers accept takeovers more frequently as they approach retirement
age, and no longer care as much whether they lose their job or power.74 The implication
is thus clear. Managers frequently prioritize self-interest, whether in the form of personal
compensation or power preservation, regardless of the cost to shareholders and other
stakeholders.
3.3.2

Is Correction of Agency Problems Impossible in Public Corporations?

Most publicly traded corporations lack a real ability to correct agency problems.
In theory, boards of directors oversee the performance of corporate managers; the board
retains the power both to select executive officers and to change their pay. Board
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governance certainly offers advantages to the corporation, namely in the form of
centralized decision-making, but the board can rarely deliver meaningful oversight of
managerial behavior because the managers themselves frequently comprise the board.
In 2012, more than half of S&P 500 corporations had the chief executive officer
also chair the board of directors. The person overseen and leading the overseeing were
thus one and the same for almost 60 percent of corporations.75 Legally, shareholders can
oust directors with a simple majority vote. However, the manager-directors can make it
very difficult for common shareholders to accumulate the necessary votes. Board
directors have the power to: (1) use corporate funds to finance re-election campaigns; (2)
stagger elections so no single election turns over control to a new group; and (3) change
the rules of the elections.76
Empirical evidence confirms how little power shareholders have over their board
of directors. From 1996 to 2005, shareholders ousted incumbent board directors a total of
45 times. For large companies, defined as having a market capitalization of over $200
million, that figure drops to a mere eight instances over the entire decade. For context, it
is worth noting that the smallest corporate market capitalization in the S&P 500 is $1.58
billion. Two-thirds of all challenges to director re-election failed, a number that pales in
comparison to the number of incumbents that won unopposed.77
Clearly, managers that sit on their own boards have a diverse toolset they can use
to protect their board positions. And when managers control the board of directors, the
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same people are charged with misbehavior and correcting the misbehavior. The
enforcement of managers‘ agential responsibilities clearly suffers as a consequence
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4.
4.1

My Conclusions
The Best Positive Theory
My aim in this paper is to arrive at the most compelling theory of the modern day

corporation. From a positive perspective, this requires an understanding of what the
corporation is and how it is structured. It seems to me that Friedman‘s shareholder theory
provides a very compelling account. While his primary issue is that he does not articulate
his notion of ‗ethical custom,‘ the spirit of Friedman‘s argument suggests that he views
the corporation as a profit-maximizer that reluctantly honors imposed legal
responsibilities and a minimal, basic set of ethical norms. The way we structure
corporations in the law and the way corporations behave both accord very well with this
understanding of Friedman‘s theory.
The law says that corporations assume a fiduciary duty to shareholders and no
other stakeholders. While the fiduciary duty does not necessarily require corporations to
prioritize shareholder interests – stakeholder theorists are quick to point out how the legal
duty seeks only to prohibit managerial self-dealing – the existence of only one fiduciary
duty clarifies that managers do not have the same legal commitments to stakeholders that
they do to shareholders. The law therefore demands corporations act in one of two ways.
Either they act in the manner Friedman‘s account calls for, caring only for shareholder
interests in the context of other laws, or they honor some minimal set of legal
commitments to shareholders and then attend to other stakeholders‘ interests.78
Corporate actions indicate that most managers adopt the profit maximization
interpretation. From outsourcing to pollution, corporations routinely demonstrate a
78
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priority for shareholder returns over stakeholder well being. In many cases, managers
even go beyond shareholder theory, breaking laws and employing questionable ethics in
the pursuit of profit.79
Normative appeal aside, corporations just do not practice stakeholder
management – even if they think that they do. When GE‘s Jack Welch argued that
managers do not focus on profits, in the same breath he admitted the opposite. He called
shareholder value ―a result.‖80 If managers make robust commitments to stakeholders, but
only because they view stakeholders as instruments toward long run profits, the
commitment to stakeholders is fully explained (and required) by shareholder theory. As
Goodpaster notes, when managers view stakeholders as means to profit ―their basic
outlook subordinates other stakeholder concerns to those of stockholders.‖81 Welch‘s
argument is not a condemnation of shareholder management but of the ways most
managers approach shareholder value maximization. He understands that shareholder
value is the desired result, but implies it is maximized only when corporations
substantially commit to stakeholder welfare.82 Like Friedman, Welch implores managers
to maximize shareholder value; he just emphasizes, more than Friedman, the importance
of stakeholder relationships in the process.
Welch‘s argument, properly understood, sheds light on why firms adopt practices
like CSR so frequently. The reason is not stakeholder theory. Rather, corporations know
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that they need to maintain a positive reputation with consumers and employees in order to
maximize profits. To most this is an obvious point, but the fact that Nike‘s sales dropped
$1 billion in 1999 – the year after it was accused of exploiting Asian labor – offers
empirical proof.83
As a result, CSR initiatives prove quite consistent with shareholder theory. CSR
improves firms‘ access to human capital; one study at Stanford University found that
MBA graduates ―would sacrifice an average of $13,700 in salary to work for a socially
responsible company‖ and another found that 70 percent of North American students
would refuse to work at a socially-irresponsible firm.

84,85

CSR also protects the

corporations‘ sales. Consumers expect significant social responsibility from corporations
today and try to guide corporate behavior with their purchase decisions.86 Unsurprisingly,
brand reputation is the reason corporations most frequently list for practicing CSR.87
Firms clearly prioritize shareholder returns, even if they view stakeholder
relationships as more important for profit maximization than Friedman would have
predicted. My interpretation of Friedman‘s theory can thus be said to provide a very
persuasive positive theory of the corporation. They seek to maximize returns for
shareholders, while honoring (usually) other legal and basic ethical obligations – and are
encouraged by our legal code to do so.
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4.2

The Best Normative Theory
The corporation is a legal construct. It is only as powerful as the laws that a

government uses to define it. As a result, I argue that governments should structure these
corporations so that the effects of corporate activity will further legitimate functions of
the government.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to articulate a comprehensive account of the
legitimate aims of a state or to compare the relative merits of different aims. Instead, I
take a legitimate aim of the state that I believe the corporate entity can be understood to
advance – that of promoting the general welfare of citizens – and develop a corporate
structure that best furthers this aim.88 The fact that my structure furthers a legitimate
government aim, I argue, gives my account substantial normative appeal. I therefore
define the most compelling normative theory of the corporation as the one that best
furthers the state‘s ability to maximize the welfare of its citizens.
The corporation reduces transaction costs in business and lowers per-unit fixed
costs. If we structure a corporation in a way that allows individuals to pool resources
under singular control, then the existence of the corporate entity drives down costs of
production. More people can consume, businesses earn more profits, and more people get
hired. As Friedman put it, the incentive for creating corporations is ―the increased
product made possible.‖89 Ignoring (for now) the other societal effects that corporations
might have, we can say the corporate structure that best promotes the general welfare is
the one that maximizes the corporation‘s ability to stimulate economic activity through
decreased production costs.
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Corporations decrease costs by increasing scale. Fixed costs spread over more
individual units and transaction costs drop when more resources come under centralized
control.90 The two types of resources at the firm‘s disposal are human and financial
capital, so governments have an interest in defining the corporation in a way that
facilitates the accumulation of each type of capital.
I will start with financial capital. While debt financing remains important, the
unique function of the corporate entity is that it can increase businesses‘ access to equity
capital, or as Berle calls it, ―the wealth of innumerable individuals.‖91 On my view, the
more a theory of the corporation incentivizes individuals to provide capital, the more
persuasive it becomes. This requires knowledge of the factors that drive stockholders to
invest. According to Milton Friedman, the factor in most cases is profit alone.92 We
invest because we expect a return on our investment and we invest more when we expect
a higher return. By providing ownership of profits (stockholdership), limiting risk
(reducing liability) and encouraging managers to maximize profits (total shareholder
value, not just short term earnings), we can be plausibly understood to have maximized
the incentives for investors to provide financial capital to corporations. While investors,
through SRI, might reward the most socially-responsible companies and punish the least,
it is important to recall that just under 90 percent of investment dollars go not toward SRI
but to investments promising the highest expected returns.93
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Meanwhile, firms also need access to human capital so they can put the financial
capital to use. Interestingly, employees make decisions whether to work and how much to
work very similarly to how investors make investment decisions. Both seem to care first
for their compensation – either wages, salary, or returns – before attending to their ethical
concerns. For instance, employee motivation is most strongly correlated with
compensation, but high-paid employees are willing to sacrifice some compensation for
the chance to work at socially-responsible companies.94,95
Since general welfare depends on decreased production costs, which in turn
results from human and financial capital accumulation, it would thus appear that the best
theory of the corporation would impose a dual-fiduciary duty on corporate managers: to
the interests of investors and of shareholders. Given the aforementioned preferences of
investors and employees, this dual-agent manager will look much like Friedman‘s
corporate manager. He will pursue profits while conforming to law and very basic ethical
norms (if we make the reasonable assumption here that employees and investors would
not knowingly support illegal activity or grossly unethical behavior).
However, this account so far ignores that other factors contribute to general
welfare. Poor environmental health, for instance, would detract from general welfare
because citizens might not be able to drink or breathe without assuming enormous health
risks. To truly enjoy normative appeal, the corporation must recognize when other claims
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on the general welfare, and even when claims of other legitimate aims of the state,
outweigh the public interest in cheaper production of goods.
We can have the corporation handle competing public interests in one of two
ways. We could entrust the corporations to determine when other public interests
outweigh the public interest provided by having corporations, but the more appealing
solution is to let the public itself make this determination. Through elected officials, with
the guidance of established political institutions and the oversight of a judiciary system,
we can set limits on corporate behavior. In other words, the solution to the problem of
competing public interests comes from legislation.
But then the question arises whether we can trust the policymaking process. Here
it seems like the answer is no, due to practical and theoretical issues.
The theoretical issue is that corporations are going to be incentivized to change
the laws. If they are told to maximize profits, and they know a different set of laws would
allow for more profits, they are going to lobby for legislative change.96 As the seminal
Supreme Court case Citizens United v. FEC revealed, corporations will spend millions on
advertising campaigns for the purpose of electioneering.97 This consequence threatens the
general welfare and also other aims of the state, including the protection of liberty and
justice. Corporations‘ vast resources would allow corporations to dominate public
political discourse; their freedom of speech would deny other (real) people the freedom to
hear diverse political opinions. Furthermore, corporate political expenditures would
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subject shareholders to coerced speech if the corporations supported candidates that some
shareholders themselves opposed.98
The practical issue is that law enforcement lacks the resources to hold
corporations accountable to the laws we establish. The New York Times study on
pollution demonstrated this perfectly. As a society, we passed the Clean Water Act. We
felt that the public interest in clean water outweighed its interest the cheaper consumption
provided by corporations, as long as pollution reached levels outlawed by the legislation.
When corporations realized they would not be punished for breaking the law – even
knowing their actions were against the law – 23,000 of them violated the act. Moreover,
the 23,000 were simply those in ―significant non-compliance,‖ which was the highest
level of non-compliance that the law specified.
As a result, the profit-maximizing firm, bound only by the law, is not yet morallydefensible. It threatens the general will, public liberties, and justice by corrupting the
lawmaking process. I thus call for a ban on corporate expenditures toward electioneering
efforts. While Friedman might argue that corporate political speech is crucial for
protecting economic freedoms of association, I firmly believe that the costs of corporate
electioneering – harms to listener autonomy, to the freedom of shareholder speech, and to
the general welfare – justify barring these expenditures. But even if barred from changing
the laws, the corporation will still resist its legal constraints if the benefits from doing so
outweigh the costs of legal punishment or if law enforcement will not be able to punish
them at all. Such is the consequence of structuring the corporation as a profit maximizer:
laws alone will not lead the corporation to defer to other, more important public interests.
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Ralph Nader proposed a solution to the practical issue with federal charters. He
points out that corporate behemoths can significantly harm society when they ignore
public interests, so he believes federal charters should be required for corporations of a
certain size (both in terms of annual sales and employees).99 The charter would not look
the same for each corporation, but would enact certain provisions depending on the
industry and firm. Some of these provisions might include: (1) limits on the amount a
corporation could invest in other corporations; (2) government stock ownership; (3)
tiered liability structures that holds management more accountable; and (4) the
appointment of a public interest-trustee to serve as part of the daily management
structure.100 Even a milder form of his solution – a reserved seat on boards of directors
for a public official – would seem to offer enormous normative appeal for its likely effect
of aligning corporate actions with public interests. A report by the United States
Department of Justice indicated that both the directorship and the chartering system
would ―offer…a better solution for [corporate] accountability.‖101
The public charter solution might sound radical, but the theory behind it is not. It
would ―require corporations to meet certain public obligations in exchange for privileges
conferred through incorporation.‖102 This is precisely the solution required by my account
of the corporation. I held that the most normatively-compelling corporation was the one
structured to maximize profits but also to defer to superseding public interests.
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Friedman‘s account does not sufficiently protect public interests, but it appears the public
charter would.
Consequently, my inquiry so far produces a corporation managed for the benefit
of its shareholders and employees, that would be required to procure federal chartering
when it reached a certain size, and that would be barred from expending corporate money
toward electioneering.
However, I my theory must be refined. Knowing that my account calls for a dualfiduciary duty, and knowing also the agency problems associated with them, I wish to
adapt my account to control the consequences of managerial self-dealing as best as
possible.
Agency problems are inevitable. While efforts to align managerial self-interest
with corporate interests do mitigate the issue, corporations cannot reasonably expect
managers‘ self interest always to be the corporation‘s self-interest.103 Adam Smith and
Milton Friedman provide compelling theoretical accounts explaining why we should
always expect self-dealing in corporations.
On the other hand, I submit that the problem of accountability can be fixed.
Managers might be less likely to act on their self-interest if they are likely to be caught
and to be punished. Given that boards of directors supply the oversight of managerial
performance, it would seem plausible that banning managers from these boards, or at
least removing their voting power, would improve accountability. Managers argue that
they deserve a seat on the board because their insight informs the board‘s decisionmaking, but I do not see why a well-functioning board would not find other ways to
103
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obtain the information that the manager would contribute.104 If nothing else, the board
could consult with the manager when necessary; this information-contribution argument
does not seem to justify the manager‘s permanent seat, much less chairmanship, of the
board of directors. So I propose they do not have it.
At last, I arrive at the theory of the corporation that I believe is the most
normatively-appealing. Derived from the state‘s legitimate interest in maximizing the
welfare of its citizens, my theory says:
(1) The corporation should be managed for the benefit of its shareholders and its
employees;
(2) The corporation must obtain a federal charter when it reaches a sufficient size, the
terms of which to be determined by the state so as to best protect the general
welfare;
(3) The corporation‘s managers are not permitted to vote on decisions by the board of
directors and are strongly discouraged from serving on the board at all;
(4) The corporation may not expend corporate resources toward electioneering
efforts, defined as efforts to support or oppose candidates and/or legislation.
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